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What should we infer about future returns when we see a large number of investors 
buying  a  stock  they  had  previously  not  owned,  or  a  large  number  of  investors  completely 
liquidating their holdings of a stock? In this paper, we test how changes in ownership breadth—
the fraction of market participants with a long position in a given stock—predict the cross-
section of stock returns. 
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) (hereafter CHS) argue that in a market with short sales 
constraints, when an investor holds no long position in a stock, he is likely to have negative 
information about the stock’s fundamental value. Due to short sales constraints, this negative 
information is only partially incorporated into the stock’s price. Thus, when ownership breadth is 
low, there is a large amount of negative news missing from the stock’s price, and the stock’s 
future returns will be low.
1 
Empirically testing this theory is challenging because it requires a representative sample 
of all investors who face short sales constraints, which is usually not available at high frequency. 
Previous empirical tests of ownership breadth have measured ownership breadth among U.S. 
mutual funds, which are not representative of all U.S. investors who face short-sales constraints. 
The mismatch between available data and theory may explain why the evidence on ownership 
breadth  has  been  mixed  to  date.  Because  ownership  breadth  level  is  close  to  a  permanent 
characteristic  for  a  stock,  CHS  argue  that  focus  should  be  placed  on  ownership  breadth 
changes—essentially controlling for a stock fixed effect. CHS find that cross-sectionally, stocks 
that are held by fewer mutual funds this quarter than last quarter subsequently underperform 
stocks with mutual fund ownership breadth increases from 1979 to 1998. But Nagel (2005) 
expands the CHS sample by five years and finds that there is no relationship on average between 
mutual fund ownership breadth changes and future returns over the longer sample.
2 
                                                 
1 Most theoretical models find that short-sales constraints lead to overvaluation (e.g., Miller (1977), Harrison and 
Kreps (1978), Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)), but there are exceptions. For 
example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that short-sales constraints do not bias stock prices on average 
when investors correctly anticipate that pessimistic investors are sitting on the sidelines. Bai, Chang, and Wang 
(2006) show that, depending on the relative importance of informed versus uninformed trading motives, short-sales 
constraints can increase, decrease, or have no impact on stock prices. 
2 Cen, Lu, and Yang (2011) find that mutual fund breadth changes tend to negatively predict returns when the Baker 
and Wurgler (2006, 2007) sentiment index experiences large absolute movements. Lehavy and Sloan (2008) find 
that U.S. mutual fund ownership breadth change is positively autocorrelated, and that controlling for future breadth 




We use a new holdings dataset from the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) that is uniquely 
suited to testing the CHS theory. The investors in the data are a random, survivorship-bias-free 
sample of all investors in the SSE. During our 1996 to 2007 sample period, short sales were 
strictly prohibited in China, and there was minimal equity derivatives activity.
3 Therefore, our 
sample is also representative of all investors in the market who face short-sales constraints. 
We  find,  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  CHS  prediction,  that  high  breadth  change  stocks 
subsequently underperform low breadth change stocks when we define ownership breadth as 
CHS do—the percent of all market participants who have a long position in a stock, giving equal 
weight to each investor. The annualized difference in the four-factor alpha between the highest 
and lowest quintiles of equal-weighted total breadth change (which is not public information) in 
the first month after portfolio formation is –23%, with a t-statistic of 9.7. Abnormal returns are 
present on both the long and short sides of the hypothetical zero-investment portfolio and persist 
for  five  months  after  portfolio  formation.  (Data  on  each  stock’s  monthly  breadth  portfolio 
assignments are available on the second author’s website.) 
This finding may be consistent with the lay theory recounted by Lewis (1989): “The first 
thing you learn on the trading floor is that when large numbers of people are after the same 
commodity, be it a stock, a bond, or a job, the commodity quickly becomes overvalued.” In other 
words, ownership breadth measures popularity among noise traders who are able to move prices. 
Indeed, the breadth measure we adopt from CHS is essentially a measure of breadth among retail 
investors in China, since retail investors vastly outnumber institutions in the market. Portfolios 
formed  on  equal-weighted  breadth  change  among  only  retail  investors  have  returns  that  are 
nearly identical to portfolios formed on equal-weighted total breadth change. Lewis is silent on 
when a commodity becomes popular and therefore overvalued. We find that equal-weighted 
retail breadth change’s contemporaneous correlation with a stock’s return is negative. Therefore, 
retail investors may be causing misvaluation by leaning against price movements and delaying 
full price adjustment to fundamental news. 
As we put more weight on sophisticated investors in our breadth measure, the results 
change. When we redefine total breadth so that investors are weighted by their lagged stock 
                                                 
3 There were no equity derivatives prior to the end of 2005. From 2005 to 2007, eleven Shanghai Stock Exchange 
companies  (out  of  over  800  total  listed  companies)  were  allowed  to  issue  put  warrants.  See  Xiong  and  Yu 




market wealth, the annualized four-factor alpha difference between the highest and lowest total 
breadth change portfolios attenuates to –5% (still statistically significant). Further restricting the 
population over which we calculation wealth-weighted breadth change to institutions only, we 
reproduce the original CHS result in a completely new sample: highest-decile wealth-weighted 
institutional  breadth  change  stocks  outperform  lowest-decile  wealth-weighted  institutional 
breadth  change  stocks.  The  annualized  difference  in  the  four-factor  alphas  is  8%,  with  a  t-
statistic of 2.6. 
This last result suggests that when ownership breadth is measured within the population 
of all sophisticated investors that observe unbiased signals of the stock’s fundamental value but 
cannot short, it functions more in accordance with the CHS theory, primarily reflecting how 
much negative information is not in the stock price due to short-sales constraints. The CHS 
model does not have unsophisticated traders who observe no fundamental signals, which could 
be  why  it  no  longer  applies  once  ownership  breadth  is  measured  over  a  population  of 
predominantly unsophisticated retail investors. 
On average, institutional trades against retail investors are profitable before transactions 
costs; if a stock’s month-over-month change in the log fraction of shares owned by institutions is 
one standard deviation higher, its abnormal return in the subsequent month is 3.5% higher on an 
annualized basis. But the significance of institutional ownership percentage changes disappears 
once  we  control  for  equal-weighted  retail  breadth  changes  and  wealth-weighted  institutional 
breadth changes, while both breadth change measures remain significant return predictors. In 
other words, an institution buying shares from an individual positively predicts future returns 
only if the individual is completely liquidating his position or the institution previously had no 
position in the stock. This result indicates that how many shares in aggregate change hands 
between institutions and individuals does not matter as much as how many of each investor type 
start and end with holdings of the stock, thus demonstrating the value of disaggregated investor-
level data for forecasting future returns. 
Because we only have ownership data from China, we have no direct evidence on the 
extent to which our results generalize to other countries, just as any empirical study using only 
U.S. data cannot draw any conclusions about whether its results extend to non-U.S. markets. We 
believe that even if our results were to apply only to China, they are of general interest given the 




2007  (China  Securities  Regulatory  Commission  (2009))  and  the  second-largest  market 
capitalization among all national stock markets at year-end 2010. Although much of our data 
come from a time when the Chinese stock market was quite young, all of our main results hold in 
the second half of our sample period, suggesting that they continue to apply to China’s market 
today. 
Nevertheless, similarities between China and other markets in retail investor behavior and 
stock return patterns give us some reason to think that ownership breadth operates in the same 
way outside of China. Chinese retail investors exhibit the disposition effect, excessive trading, 
home bias, and under-diversification, just as U.S. investors do (Chen et al. (2007), Feng and 
Seasholes (2008)). Chen et al. (2010) test 18 variables that have been shown to predict cross-
sectional  stock  returns  in  the  U.S.  market  and  find  that  in  the  1995  to  2007  period,  all  18 
variables’ point estimates in univariate Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions have signs consistent 
with  the  U.S.  evidence,  and  five  are  statistically  significant,  compared  to  eight  significant 
coefficients for the U.S. markets during this same period. 
In addition to the literature on ownership breadth, our paper is related to research that 
attempts to empirically detect the price impact of short-sales constraints,
4 research on investor 
sentiment measures,
5 and research on the portfolio performance of institutional versus individual 
investors.
6 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes our data, and 
Section II defines the variables we use in the analysis. Section III presents the main tests of 
ownership breadth’s ability to predict the cross-section of stock returns. Section IV shows how 
returns,  breadth,  and  institutional  ownership  behave  around  the  formation  date  of  portfolios 
sorted on breadth change, which gives us insight into the decisions that result in breadth changes 
                                                 
4 These  studies  have  adopted  a  number  of  proxies  to  measure  short-sales  constraints,  such  as  analyst  forecast 
dispersion (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Yu (2009)), short interest (Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), 
Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006)), the introduction of traded options (Figlewski and Webb (1993), Danielsen 
and Sorescu (2001), Mayhew and Mihov (2005)), and lending fees (Jones and Lamont (2002), D’Avolio (2002), 
Reed (2002), Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002), Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002), Ofek and Richardson (2003),  
Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004), Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007)). 
5 Examples include Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), Cornelli, Goldreich, and 
Ljunqvist (2006), Kumar and Lee (2006), Qiu and Welch (2006), Tetlock (2007), Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), 
Hwang (2011), Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012), and Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl (2012). 
6 See, for example, Gruber (1996), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Zheng (1999), Chen, Jegadeesh, 
and Wermers (2000), Seasholes and Wu (2007), Frazzini and Lamont (2008), Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008), 
Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2008), Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009), Kelley and Tetlock (2010), and 




and why breadth changes might be related to future returns. Section V explores the relationship 
between  breadth  changes  and  changes  in  institutional  ownership  percentages.  Section  VI 
compares  the  return-predicting  ability  of  retail  breadth  changes  in  months  with  and  without 
earnings announcements to assess whether breadth changes reflect anything more than trading by 
investors with private information. Section VII investigates the extent to which breadth changes 
predict  future  returns  via  a  Merton  (1987)  investor  recognition  channel,  and  Section  VIII 
discusses the different implications that ownership initiations versus discontinuations have for 
future returns. Section IX concludes. 
 
I. Data description 
Our ownership breadth data come from the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). At the end 
of 2007—the last year of our sample period—the 860 stocks traded on the SSE had a total 
market capitalization of $3.7 trillion, making it the world’s sixth-largest stock exchange behind 
NYSE,  Tokyo,  Euronext,  Nasdaq,  and  London.  Mainland  China’s  other  stock  exchange,  the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, had a $785 billion market capitalization at year-end 2007. By year-
end 2010, China’s stock market had the second-largest market capitalization among all countries 
of the world, behind only the U.S. 
Almost all SSE shares are A shares, which only domestic investors could hold until 2003. 
At year-end 2007, A shares constituted over 99% of SSE market capitalization. B shares are 
quoted in U.S. dollars and can be held by foreign and (since 2001) domestic investors. Shares are 
further  classified  into  tradable  and  non-tradable  shares.  Non-tradable  shares  have  the  same 
voting and cashflow rights as tradable shares and are typically owned directly by the Chinese 
government (“state-owned shares”) or by government-controlled domestic financial institutions 
and corporations (“legal person shares”).
7 We use the term “tradable market capitalization” to 
refer to the value of tradable A shares, and “total market capitalization” to refer to the combined 
                                                 
7 Beginning in April 2005, non-tradable shares began to be converted to tradable status, although the conversion 
process was slow enough that as of year-end 2007, 72% of total Chinese market capitalization remained non-
tradable. Converted tradable shares were subject to a one-year lockup, and investors holding more than a 5% stake 
were subject to selling restrictions for an additional two years. Dropping returns starting in May 2006 (the month 
after the first formerly non-tradable shares became liquid and thus begin to appear in our holdings data) does not 
qualitatively affect our breadth portfolio alpha estimates in Table 5, except that in the shorter sample, the long-short 
wealth-weighted total breadth change portfolio’s three-factor alpha is significant at the 1% level, and the long-short 
wealth-weighted institutional breadth change portfolio’s one-factor alpha is significant at the 10% level and the four-




value  of  tradable  and  non-tradable  A  shares.  During  our  sample  period,  about  27%  of  SSE 
market capitalization was tradable. 
To  trade  on  the  SSE,  both  retail  and  institutional  investors  are  required  to  open  an 
account with the Exchange, at which point they must identify themselves to the Exchange as an 
individual or an institution. Each account uniquely and permanently identifies an investor, even 
if the account later becomes empty. Investors cannot have multiple accounts. The data assembled 
by the Exchange for this paper consists of the entire history of SSE tradable A-share holdings 
from January 1996 to May 2007 for a representative random sample of all accounts that existed 
at the end of May 2007. Since there are far fewer institutional accounts than retail accounts, the 
Exchange over-sampled institutional investors in order to ensure that a meaningful number of 
institutional accounts were extracted.
8 The market-wide statistics computed from these account 
data  are  reweighted  to  adjust  for  the  over-sampling  of  institutional  investors.  The  sample 
contains both currently active and inactive accounts, so there is no survivorship bias, and in 
expectation, a constant fraction of the accounts extant at any date are represented. The number of 
accounts  in  the  sample  grows  from  36,349  retail  accounts  and  360  institutional  accounts  to 
384,709  retail  accounts  and  20,727  institutional  accounts  from  January  1996  to  May  2007. 
Holdings data are aggregated at the Exchange into stock-level measures. The aggregation is 
carried out under arrangements that maintain strict confidentiality requirements to ensure that no 
individual account data are disclosed.  
Table 1 shows the mean and median value in RMB of an investor’s holdings in a single 
company, conditional on investing in the company, as well as the mean and median value of an 
investor’s total stock portfolio. For most of the sample period, the exchange rate was about 8.3 
RMB per U.S. dollar, but it then fell to 7.7 RMB per U.S. dollar from July 2005 to May 2007. 
Retail investors start with a mean (median) stock position value of 8,069 (3,900) RMB and a 
mean (median) total portfolio value of 22,179 (8,680) RMB in 1996. By 2007, the last year of 
our sample, these values have increased to 21,992 (6,670) RMB and 54,759 (13,620) RMB, 
respectively. Even adjusting for the 16% rise in the Chinese consumer price index over this 
period, this represents a sizable increase in the position and portfolio values of retail investors. 
Institutions start with a mean (median) stock position value of 738,976 (54,375) RMB, and a 
                                                 




mean (median) total portfolio value of 3,572,650 (198,102) RMB in 1996. Their mean (median) 
stock  position  value  increased  to  8,153,493  (185,187)  RMB  and  their  total  portfolio  value 
increased to 32,808,349 (330,980) RMB by 2007. Institutional investors’ portfolio values grew 
much more quickly than retail investors’, particularly for the means. The median institutional 
investor portfolio is strikingly small throughout the sample period—far less than 100,000 USD—
and the large difference between the mean and the median values indicates that the portfolio 
value distribution is extremely right-skewed. 
We  obtain  stock  return,  market  capitalization,  earnings  announcement  date,  and 
accounting data from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). 
 
II. Variable definitions 
Following CHS, we define the equal-weighted total ownership breadth change of stock i 
in month t as follows. We first restrict the sample to investors who have a long position in at 
least one SSE stock at the end of both t – 1 and t. This restriction ensures that the breadth change 
measure captures only the trading activity of existing market participants, rather than changes in 
the investor universe due to new market participants entering and institutions dissolving.
9 Equal-
weighted  total  ownership  breadth  change  is  the  difference  between  the  end  of  
t – 1 and the end of t in the fraction of these subsample investors who own stock i. We obtain 
equal-weighted retail breadth change and equal-weighted institutional breadth change by further 
restricting  the  investor  subsample  to  retail  investors  or  institutional  investors.  Stocks  almost 
never have an empty set of retail owners in our sample, but zero ownership is more frequent 
within our institutional sample, particularly among small-cap stocks. At each time period, we do 
not calculate breadth change for stocks that have zero owners in the relevant subsample at either 
t – 1 or t, since the breadth change measure we obtain would be censored. 
A stock’s equal-weighted total ownership breadth increases when one investor partially 
liquidates her position in the stock to sell to one or more investors who previously did not own 
the stock, or one investor completely liquidates her position by selling her shares to two or more 
                                                 
9 Portfolio returns are quite similar if we instead require that investors have a long position at either t – 1 or t. When 
we construct wealth-weighted breadth change, described later in this section, using this alternative sample definition, 




investors who previously did not own the stock. Note that market clearing does not constrain a 
stock’s equal-weighted total ownership breadth change to be zero. 
To assess the extent to which unsophisticated investors drive the negative correlation 
between total ownership breadth change and future returns, we use an alternative measure of 
ownership breadth not found in CHS that de-emphasizes small investors by weighting investors 
by the value of their SSE portfolio at the beginning of the month.
10 To calculate wealth-weighted 
total ownership breadth change at t, we again restrict the sample to investors who have a long 
position in at least one SSE stock at the end of both t – 1 and t. Wealth-weighted ownership 
breadth change is 
    (1) 
where Wv,t is the SSE stock portfolio value of investor v at month t’s market open, Vi,t is the set 
of subsample investors who held stock i at the end of month t, and At is the entire subsample of 
investors who owned at least one SSE stock at the end of both t – 1 and t. Wealth-weighted retail 
breadth change and wealth-weighted institutional breadth change are defined analogously over 
their respective investor populations. 
Breadth change can be decomposed into the variables IN and OUT. Equal-weighted IN is 
the percent of subsample investors who had a zero position in stock i at the end of t – 1 and a 
positive position at the end of t. Equal-weighted OUT is the percent of subsample investors who 
moved from a positive position to a zero position in stock i between the ends of t – 1 and t. By 
construction, equal-weighted breadth change is equal-weighted IN minus equal-weighted OUT. 
Wealth-weighted IN and OUT are defined analogously. For example, wealth-weighted IN is the 
month t opening SSE stock portfolio value of subsample investors who moved from a zero 
position to a positive position in stock i between t – 1 and t divided by the month t opening SSE 
stock portfolio value of all subsample investors. 
                                                 
10 Small investors have fewer resources with which to gather information. Natural selection arguments such as that 
of Friedman (1953) may also lead to rational individuals becoming over-represented among wealthy investors. 
However, Yan (2008) shows that the natural selection mechanism does not robustly reduce irrational investors’ 
wealth share. 













Our  main  cross-sectional  analysis  involves  evaluating  the  return  performance  of 
portfolios formed on breadth changes. We estimate one, three, and four-factor alphas, where the 
factor portfolio returns capture CAPM beta, size, value, and momentum effects. The market 
portfolio return is the composite Shanghai and Shenzhen market return, weighted by tradable 
market capitalization. The riskfree return is the demand deposit rate. We construct size and value 
factor  returns  (SMB  and  HML,  respectively)  for  the  Chinese  stock  market  according  to  the 
methodology of Fama and French (1993), but using the entire Shanghai/Shenzhen stock universe 
to calculate percentile breakpoints. We form SMB based on total (i.e., tradable plus non-tradable) 
market capitalization and HML based on the ratio of book equity to total market capitalization, 
weighting stocks within component sub-portfolios by their tradable market capitalization.
11 We 
construct  the  momentum  factor  portfolio  MOM  following  the  methodology  described  on 
Kenneth French’s website. We calculate the 50th percentile total market capitalization at month-
end t – 1 and the 30th and 70th percentile cumulative stock returns over months t – 12 to t – 2, 
again using the entire Shanghai/Shenzhen stock universe to calculate percentile breakpoints. The 
intersections  of  these  breakpoints  delineate  six  tradable-market-capitalization-weighted  sub-
portfolios for which we compute month t returns. MOM is the equally weighted average of the 
two recent-winner sub-portfolio returns minus the equally weighted average of the two recent-
loser sub-portfolio returns. 
We  control  for  other  possible  predictors  of  returns  using  Fama-MacBeth  (1973) 
regressions, where the predictor variables are the stock’s breadth change (defined in various 
ways), log of total market capitalization, book-to-market ratio (the value at year-end τ – 1 is used 
as the predictor from July of year τ through June of year τ + 1), return during the last year 
excluding the prior month, return during the prior month, sum of monthly turnover during the 
prior quarter, change in the log percent of tradable A shares owned by institutions during the 
prior  month  (as  measured  in  our  ownership  data),  Amivest  liquidity  ratio  (described  further 
below) during the prior month, shadow cost of incomplete information, and two dummies for 
whether the stock’s share trading volume during the prior week was in the top tenth or bottom 
tenth of the ten most recent weeks (Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001)). We operationalize 
the Amivest liquidity ratio as the sum of the stock’s yuan trading volume over one month divided 
                                                 
11 Whenever possible, we use the book equity value that was originally released to investors. If this is unavailable, 




by the sum of the stock’s absolute daily returns over that month. Higher values of the liquidity 
ratio correspond to lower price impacts of trading, and hence higher liquidity. The shadow cost 
of  incomplete  information,  λ,  captures  abnormal  returns  due  to  Merton’s  (1987)  “investor 
recognition hypothesis” that investors neglect to hold stocks they are unaware of, causing the 
investors who do hold these neglected stocks to sacrifice diversification and hence demand a 
higher expected return. Investor recognition is closely related to ownership breadth changes, so it 
is important to explore the extent to which breadth changes predict returns through the investor 
recognition channel. We adopt the operationalization of λ used by Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009): 
    (2) 
where  2.5  is  an  arbitrary  constant  representing  aggregate  investor  risk  aversion,   is  the 
variance of the residuals from regressing stock i’s excess monthly returns on Chinese market 
excess returns from month t – 35 to month t; xit is stock i’s tradable A-share market capitalization 
as a fraction of total Chinese tradable A-share market capitalization at month-end t; and Mit is the 
number of investors holding stock i at month-end t divided by the total number of investors at 
month-end t. In calculating Mit, we define “total number of investors” as all investors with at 
least one long SSE position at t (and do not condition on t – 1 holdings). 
  Table 2 displays summary statistics for the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis. 
Because the number of stocks listed on the SSE expanded rapidly during our sample period, we 
adopt the following procedure in order to keep later time periods from dominating the summary 
statistics.  We  calculate  separately  for  each  month  the  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  each 
variable. The table reports the time-series average of these monthly mean and standard deviation 
series. 
The summary statistics for equal-weighted retail breadth change are nearly identical to 
those for equal-weighted total breadth change, since retail investors vastly outnumber institutions. 
Because institutions have disproportionately large stock holdings, wealth-weighted total breadth 
changes do not follow wealth-weighted retail breadth changes nearly as closely. 
Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of breadth changes separately for each 
year of our sample. The mean equal-weighted breadth changes are close to zero in every year; 
the  largest  magnitude  occurs  in  1996,  when  the  mean  equal-weighted  institutional  breadth 
change  takes  on  a  value  of  only  –0.069%.  The  average  wealth-weighted  breadth  changes 
   









experience considerably more variation, particularly among institutions. The average wealth-
weighted institutional breadth change experiences two valleys of –0.446% and –0.525% in 1996 
and 2003, respectively. The cross-sectional standard deviation of breadth changes generally falls 
as the sample period progresses, with the exception of institutional wealth-weighted breadth 
changes, which exhibits its greatest dispersion from 1998 to 2000, and total wealth-weighted 
breadth changes, whose dispersion follows a U-shaped path with respect to time. 
Table 4 contains the correlations among the various breadth measures. Equal-weighted 
total and retail breadth changes are almost perfectly positively correlated with each other. Equal-
weighted  institutional  breadth  changes  are  mildly  positively  correlated  (0.054)  with  equal-
weighted retail breadth changes. Wealth-weighted retail breadth changes are strongly positively 
correlated with equal-weighted retail breadth changes, but the correlation coefficient of 0.643 
indicates  that  there  is  still  considerable  divergence  between  these  two  retail  breadth  change 
measures.  Wealth-weighted  institutional  breadth  change  is  negatively  correlated  with  retail 
breadth  change,  and  this  negative  correlation  is  stronger  with  equal-weighted  retail  breadth 
change  (–0.117)  than  with  wealth-weighted  retail  breadth  change  (–0.030).  Wealth-weighted 
institutional breadth change exhibits only some positive correlation (0.305) with equal-weighted 
institutional  breadth  change,  showing  that  large  institutions  behave  differently  from  small 
institutions. 
 
III. Main return prediction tests 
A. Forecasting one-month-ahead returns 
  We test the ability of breadth changes to predict the cross-section of returns by using 
breadth changes to form portfolios. Following CHS, at the end of each month t, we sort stocks 
into  five  groups  based  on  tradable  market  capitalization  (0th  to  20th  size  percentile,  20th 
percentile to 40th size percentile, …, 80th percentile to 100th size percentile). Within each size 
quintile, we form five sub-portfolios based on breadth change during t, creating a total of 25 sub-
portfolios. The breadth change breakpoints that determine the sub-portfolio boundaries differ by 
size quintile, so that all 25 sub-portfolios contain the same number of stocks. We weight stocks 
by tradable market capitalization within each sub-portfolio. To form the “Quintile n” breadth 
change portfolio, we equally weight across size quintiles the five nth quintile breadth change 




month t + 1. We adopt this sequential sorting methodology because the volatility of breadth 
change increases with firm size. If we sorted stocks by breadth change without considering size, 
very few small firms would be in the extreme quintiles of breadth change. 
  Table 5 shows the breadth change portfolios’ raw excess returns and alphas generated by 
time-series regressions. The left half of Panel A shows that returns decrease monotonically with 
equal-weighted total breadth change. On a raw-return basis, the lowest quintile outperforms the 
highest quintile by 204 basis points per month, or 24.5% per year, with a t-statistic of 10.2. The 
lowest quintile has an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.11, and a (non-investable) zero-investment 
portfolio that holds the lowest quintile long and the highest quintile short has a Sharpe ratio of 
2.97.  In  comparison,  during  this  137-month  period,  the  Sharpe  ratio  of  all  Shanghai  Stock 
Exchange A shares weighted by tradable market capitalization was 0.77, and the Sharpe ratio of 
the U.S. CRSP value-weighted index was 0.49. 
The return differential between the lowest and highest breadth change quintiles barely 
falls when we adjust the return using the CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor models: It is 202 
basis points per month (24.2% per year) with a t-statistic of 9.6 when we adjust for CAPM beta 
risk, 197 basis points per month (23.6% per year) with a t-statistic of 9.4 when we additionally 
adjust for size and value effects, and 194 basis points per month (23.3% per year) with a t-
statistic of 9.7 when we additionally adjust for size, value, and momentum effects.
12 Abnormal 
returns  come  not  only  from  underperformance  in  the  highest  total  breadth  change  portfolio 
(which cannot be shorted), but also from outperformance in the lowest total breadth change 
portfolio, which has a significant positive four-factor alpha of 112 basis points per month (13.4% 
per year). 
These  results  are  contrary  to  the  CHS  model,  which  predicts  that  future  returns  are 
increasing in ownership breadth, since high breadth means fewer investors with bad news are 
sitting on the sidelines.
13 The remainder of this subsection shows that ownership breadth among 
small, unsophisticated investors is responsible for the rejection of the CHS prediction.  
                                                 
12 The average of the long-only test portfolio alphas are not approximately zero mainly because the test portfolios 
contain only Shanghai Stock Exchange stocks, whereas our factor portfolios contain both Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange stocks. 
13 Although the model of Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) has only one risky asset and cannot be used to analyze 
cross-sectional  returns  directly,  their  intuition  could  potentially  lead  to  the  implication  that  ownership  breadth 
increases should predict lower future returns through a short-sales constraint channel: A breadth increase implies 





In the right half of Table 5’s Panel A, we see that when we use wealth-weighted total 
breadth changes to form portfolios, the raw return difference between the lowest and highest 
breadth change quintiles falls 82% to 36 basis points per month (4.3% per year), although this 
difference remains significant at the 5% level. Adjusting the difference by the one-factor, three-
factor, or four-factor model yields slightly larger and still-significant alphas: 45 basis points, 41 
basis points, and 42 basis points per month (5.4%, 4.9%, and 5.0% per year), respectively. 
Further evidence on the role of unsophisticated investors comes from Panels B and C of 
Table 5, which show returns and alphas of portfolios formed from sorts on retail or institutional 
breadth changes. In Panel B, paralleling the sorts on total breadth changes, we sort stocks into 
quintiles  based  on  retail  breadth  changes.  For  the  portfolios  based  on  institutional  breadth 
changes in Panel C, however, our breadth change breakpoints are the 10th and 90th percentiles 
instead of the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles. This is because a large number of stocks 
every month have an equal-weighted institutional breadth change equal to zero.
14 
We  see  in  the  left  half  of  Panel  C  that  stocks  experiencing  large  equal-weighted 
institutional breadth increases do not significantly underperform stocks experiencing large equal-
weighted institutional breadth decreases. The negative relationship between equal-weighted total 
breadth changes and future returns in Panel A is entirely driven by retail investors; the returns of 
portfolios formed on equal-weighted retail breadth changes in the left half of Panel B are very 
close  to  those  of  portfolios  formed  on  equal-weighted  total  breadth  changes.
15 As  we  have 
                                                                                                                                                           
uninformed investors become more certain about the stock’s future payoffs and require lower returns. However, if 
institutions are the informed investors in the market, then our finding that institutional breadth increases lead to 
higher future returns is the opposite of what the above story predicts. 
14 Out of 137 × 3 × 5 = 2,055 potential subportfolio-months, there is an empty equal-weighted institutional breadth 
change subportfolio 11 times and an empty wealth-weighted institutional breadth change subportfolio three times. 
When a subportfolio is empty, we exclude its return and average over the non-empty subportfolios. 
15 It is believed that Chinese mutual fund managers sometimes front-run their own fund’s trades by trading in retail 
accounts (Ren (2011)). This practice is known by the colorful name of “rat trading” and could raise the concern that 
employees of institutional investors are responsible for much of the retail trading we observe. However, we find that 
retail  breadth  increases  lead  to  lower  subsequent  returns,  which  suggests  that  front-running  is  not  a  major 
determinant of retail breadth changes in our data. It is also believed that some institutions used individual IDs to 
open  a  large  number  of  accounts,  which  are  dubbed  “gunny  sack  accounts,”  mostly  in  order  to  increase  the 
institution’s allocation of underpriced IPO shares, since there is a quota for the maximum allocation to each account. 
This  practice  is  thought  to  have  gradually  disappeared  since  2002,  when  the  Chinese  Securities  Regulatory 
Commission  tightened  its  oversight.  There  were  also  anecdotal  cases  of  institutions  using  these  accounts  to 
manipulate stock prices (e.g., Zhou (2005)). Our retail breadth findings are not driven by IPO-related trading, since 
we obtain similar results after excluding newly issued stocks. Our findings are also not likely to be due to price 





previously noted, equal-weighted total breadth change and equal-weighted retail breadth change 
are almost identical due to the large number of retail investors. 
Moving to wealth-weighted breadth changes among investor subsamples, we find that the 
increased emphasis on institutions in the wealth-weighted total breadth change measure is not the 
only reason why wealth-weighting attenuates the negative relationship between total breadth 
changes and future returns. Even when forming portfolios based on breadth changes among retail 
investors alone, wealth-weighting decreases the spread between the high and low breadth change 
portfolio returns. The alphas of the difference between the lowest and highest wealth-weighted 
retail breadth change portfolios in Panel B are between 142 and 143 basis points per month  
(17.0% to 17.1% per year), which is smaller than the 193 to 202 basis point per month difference 
between  the  lowest  and  highest  equal-weighted  retail  breadth  change  portfolios  (albeit  not 
significantly so). 
When we form portfolios on wealth-weighted breadth changes among institutions only—
the measure that places the most emphasis on the large institutions that are probably the most 
sophisticated investors in the market—the sign of the relationship between breadth changes and 
future returns flips, reproducing the CHS empirical result: The high wealth-weighted institutional 
breadth change portfolio significantly outperforms the low wealth-weighted institutional breadth 
change portfolio by 58, 60, 71, and 67 basis points per month (7.0%, 7.2%, 8.5%, and 8.0% per 
year)  on  a  raw,  one-factor-adjusted,  three-factor-adjusted,  and  four-factor-adjusted  basis, 
respectively. Unlike CHS’s empirical results, however, the abnormal returns are present only in 
the high breadth change portfolio (which has a Sharpe ratio of 0.98) and are absent from the low 
breadth change portfolio. We speculate that the absence of abnormal negative returns in the low 
breadth change portfolio is due to institutional breadth decreases reflecting not only negative 
information but also the need to service customer redemptions. 
The large difference between wealth-weighted and equal-weighted institutional breadth 
changes is not necessarily surprising in light of the fact that there are many institutions with 
extremely small stock portfolios. Recall that the median institution in our sample holds a stock 
portfolio  worth  less  than  100,000  U.S.  dollars.  The  median  number  of  stocks  held  by  an 
institution in May 2007 is one. Although we do not know the identities of the institutions in our 
                                                                                                                                                           
individual  accounts  in  pump-and-dump  schemes,  retail  breadth  changes  should  be  positively  correlated  with 




data, we suspect that these small institutional portfolios are held by non-financial companies that 
do not employ professional portfolio managers and thus trade like unsophisticated investors. 
 
B. Persistence of abnormal returns after portfolio formation 
Both retail and institutional breadth changes predict returns, but we document in this 
subsection that only retail breadth changes significantly predict returns beyond one month into 
the future. This difference in persistence is evidence that retail breadth changes do not predict 
returns merely because they are negatively correlated with institutional breadth changes. (We 
will formally test the independent ability of retail versus institutional breadth changes to predict 
returns in the Fama-MacBeth analysis in Section V.) 
To assess breadth change’s predictive power for returns k months ahead, we sort stocks 
into quintiles based on their month-end t tradable market capitalization. Within each size quintile, 
we form month t breadth change quintile breakpoints (for total and retail breadth change) or 10th 
and 90th percentile month t breadth change breakpoints (for institutional breadth change). We 
calculate  each  size  ×  breadth  change  sub-portfolio’s  t  +  k  return,  weighting  stocks  by  
t + k – 1 tradable market capitalization. We finally compute the equal-weighted average of the  
t + k returns of all the highest breadth change sub-portfolios across size quintiles minus the 
equal-weighted average of the t + k returns of all the lowest breadth change sub-portfolios across 
size quintiles. Repeating this procedure each calendar month produces a “t + k” return spread 
time series. 
Table 6 shows the one, three, and four-factor alphas of return spreads for k = 2, 3, …, 12. 
For brevity, we will discuss only the four-factor alphas, although the other alpha results are quite 
similar. Equal-weighted retail breadth change significantly predicts returns in every month up to 
five months into the future. At month t + 5, the difference between the highest and lowest 
breadth change portfolio four-factor alphas is still –42 basis points (–5.0% annualized). Even 
though the four-factor alpha differences are no longer significant from months t + 6 to t + 12, 
their point estimates are all negative with the exception of month t + 9. Wealth-weighted retail 
breadth change shows a similar amount of predictive persistence; the four-factor alpha difference 
between  the  highest  and  lowest  wealth-weighted  retail  breadth  change  quintiles  stops  being 
significant after month t + 5, with the exception of a significant negative spread at t + 10. 




horizon, we see that from t to t + 5, equal-weighted retail breadth change always predicts a larger 
spread than wealth-weighted retail breadth change, consistent with our t + 1 results in Table 5. 
In contrast, institutional breadth change does not significantly predict returns beyond one 
month, whether breadth changes are equal- or wealth-weighted. None of the four-factor alpha 
differences in Table 6 under the institutional columns is significant. However, it is notable that 
for wealth-weighted institutional breadth change, the four-factor alpha difference point estimates 
are positive in nine out of the eleven time horizons. 
As in Table 5, the predictive power of total breadth change beyond the first month is 
driven by retail investors. The four-factor alpha spreads between the highest and lowest equal-
weighted total breadth change quintiles are almost the same as those between the highest and 
lowest equal-weighted retail breadth change quintiles. For portfolios formed on wealth-weighted 
total  breadth  change,  where  institutions  have  more  influence,  the  alpha  spread  significance 
disappears beyond the first month. 
 
C. Subsample tests 
In this subsection, we perform our return prediction tests on five subsamples. The first 
two subsamples are the first half of the sample period (1996-2001) and the second half of the 
sample period (2002-2007). The third and fourth subsamples restrict portfolios to the smallest 
and largest size quintiles of stocks. The fifth subsample excludes companies that have issued or 
repurchased shares in the past twelve months. The motivation for this last exclusion is that stocks 
may systematically experience breadth increases around share issuances and breadth decreases 
around share repurchases. In the U.S. market, IPOs and seasoned issues generally have low 
returns after the issuance date (Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995)), and stocks whose 
companies have repurchased shares have high subsequent returns (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995)). Therefore, including these stocks in our sample may cause us to confound 
issuance and repurchase effects with a breadth change effect. 
Table 7 shows, for each subsample, the one, three, and four-factor alpha spreads between 
the highest breadth change and lowest breadth change quantiles in the first month after stocks are 
sorted by breadth change. The retail breadth change results, whether equal-weighted or wealth-
weighted, are robustly present in all subsamples. Unlike many return anomalies documented in 




large stocks than small stocks. Excluding recent issuers and repurchasers has no effect on the 
results. Interestingly, the magnitudes of the retail four-factor alpha spreads in the first half of the 
sample are significantly larger
16 than those in the second half. This could be consistent with 
increasing  sophistication  of  retail  investors  over  time  and/or  increasing  aggressiveness  of 
institutional investors over time in betting against retail breadth changes, thus attenuating future 
abnormal returns. 
In contrast, the alpha spreads for portfolios formed on institutional breadth change are not 
significant in some subsamples. Equal-weighted institutional breadth change portfolios continue 
not to significantly predict returns in every subsample except when restricting to the 1996 to 
2001 period, when its one and three-factor alphas are negative and significant. Wealth-weighted 
institutional breadth change generates a significant alpha spread only in the second half of the 
sample; in the first half, the four-factor spread is 45 basis points per month (5.4% per year) but 
insignificant, whereas in the second half, it is 106 basis points per month (12.7% per year) and 
highly  significant.  Wealth-weighted  institutional  breadth  change  also  significantly  predicts 
returns only among large stocks (four-factor alpha spread of 161 basis points per month, or 19.2% 
per year), not small stocks (insignificant four-factor alpha spread of 33 basis points per month, or 
4.0%  per  year).  The  wealth-weighted  institutional  breadth  change  results  are  not  affected, 
however,  by  excluding  recent  issuers  and  repurchasers.  These  differences  in  alphas  across 
subsamples could be due to an increase in sophistication among domestic financial institutions 
over time, the entry of sophisticated foreign institutions into the SSE in 2003, and the fact that 
financial institutions tend to focus their attention on large stocks.  
 
IV. Behavior of returns, breadth, and institutional ownership around portfolio formation 
In order to better understand the decisions that result in breadth changes and why breadth 
changes might affect prices, we examine in this section the behavior of returns, breadth changes, 
and  institutional  ownership  percentage  in  a  48-month  window  around  the  breadth  change 
portfolio formation month. 
 
                                                 
16 The differences are significant at the 5% level or greater, except for the three-factor equal-weighted retail alphas, 




A. Behavior around equal-weighted retail breadth change portfolio formation 
The top graph in Figure 1 shows the average excess returns of the lowest, middle, and 
highest equal-weighted retail breadth change portfolios as a function of months since portfolio 
formation.  Returns  on  and  during  the  24  months  after  the  portfolio  formation  month  t  are 
constructed exactly as described in Tables 5 and 6. Returns prior to t are constructed analogously 
to  returns  after  t.  We  sort  stocks  into  quintiles  based  on  their  month-end  t  tradable  market 
capitalization. Within each size quintile, we form month t breadth change quintile breakpoints. 
We calculate each size × breadth change sub-portfolio’s t – j return, weighting stocks by t – j – 1 
tradable market capitalization. Finally, we calculate the t – j return of the “Quintile n portfolio” 
as the equal-weighted average of the five nth quintile breadth change sub-portfolio returns, for  
j = 1, 2, …, 24.
17  
We see in the graph that retail investors tend to start investing in stocks that have had a 
winning streak during the prior 24 months broken by a low return this month, and they tend to 
exit stocks with the opposite return pattern.
18 This behavior could be consistent with individuals 
using  a  representativeness  heuristic  (Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1974),  Barberis,  Shleifer,  and 
Vishny (1998)) to judge that a stock that has had consistently high returns in the past is likely to 
continue this performance in the future, so an anomalous price dip today represents an attractive 
buying opportunity because the stock’s price will soon bounce back to its previously established 
trend line. But when many retail investors act upon this belief by buying new positions in a stock, 
it  on  average  continues  to  underperform  next  month  and  does  not  outperform  subsequently, 
contrary  to  the  representativeness  heuristic  prediction.  Conversely,  a  stock  that  has  had 
consistently low returns in the past is thought to be likely to continue underperforming in the 
future, so an unusual price increase today creates an attractive temporary exit opportunity for 
                                                 
17 Returns  in  months  prior  to  t  are  biased  downwards  because  stocks  are  sorted  into  portfolios  using  future 
information, month t market capitalization. Stocks with low realized returns from t – k to t tend to be sorted into the 
small stock quintile and so have high weights at t – k when we value-weight the stocks in this quintile. Similarly, 
stocks with high realized returns tend to be sorted into the large stock quintile and have low weights. Returns after t 
do not suffer from this look-ahead bias, so we cannot directly compare returns prior to t to returns afterwards. 
However, comparisons across different size quintile within a given pre-formation month are informative. 
18 This pattern is also consistent with previous empirical findings in other countries on retail investor reactions to 
returns at different horizons (Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001), Benartzi (2001), 
Goetzmann and Massa (2002), Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003), Jackson (2003), Richards (2005), Kaniel, Saar, 




owners of the stock.
19 But when many retail investors respond by completely liquidating their 
positions, the stock continues to outperform after the portfolio formation month and does not 
underperform subsequently. 
The negative correlation between returns and retail investor breadth change during the 
portfolio formation month suggests that retail breadth does not predict future returns due to 
pump-and-dump schemes where institutions artificially push up prices in order to attract trend-
chasing retail investors before selling at a profit. The negative correlation also suggests that if 
retail investors cause return continuation, they do so by trading against fundamental news and 
inhibiting full price reaction during the formation month. The lack of subsequent return reversals 
is inconsistent with the abnormal portfolio returns after month t being caused by retail-trading-
induced price-overshooting. The middle graph of Figure 1 shows that high retail breadth change 
stocks  continue  to  have  significantly  elevated  retail  breadth  change  in  the  month  following 
portfolio formation, and a similar pattern holds for low retail breadth change stocks. The positive 
autocorrelation of retail breadth changes may contribute to the persistence of abnormal returns 
following the portfolio formation month. 
If  high  retail  breadth  change  stocks  typically  have  large  return  run-ups  prior  to  the 
portfolio formation month that are reversed afterwards, could retail investors play a role in the 
prior run-up? If they do, we might guess that high retail breadth change stocks were overvalued 
prior to the portfolio formation month, and the formation month is when the bubble begins to 
burst. Although average returns of high retail breadth change stocks consistently exceed those of 
low retail breadth change stocks from the second to the 24th month prior to portfolio formation, 
the former group’s retail breadth change consistently lies above the latter’s only for the five 
months immediately prior to the formation month, and the difference is large only for the last 
two  months.  In  addition,  as  shown  in  the  bottom  graph  of  Figure  1,  average  institutional 
ownership of high retail breadth change stocks is always higher than that of low retail breadth 
change  stocks  prior  to  the  formation  month,  and  this  ordering  reverses  during  and  after  the 
formation month. In sum, there is no strong evidence that retail investors are responsible for the 
majority of high retail breadth change stocks’ run-up prior to portfolio formation. 
 
                                                 
19 Alternatively, the price rise today might cause some owners’ paper losses to become paper gains, causing them to 




B. Behavior around wealth-weighted institutional breadth change portfolio formation 
  Figure 2 contains graphs that are analogous to those in Figure 1, but the series correspond 
to portfolios formed on wealth-weighted institutional breadth changes, and the middle graph 
shows wealth-weighted institutional breadth changes instead of equal-weighted retail breadth 
changes. 
  In contrast to what we found in Figure 1 with equal-weighted retail breadth changes, the 
top graph in Figure 2 shows that stocks with high wealth-weighted institutional breadth changes 
have higher returns than stocks with low wealth-weighted institutional breadth changes in both 
the portfolio formation month and the first month prior to portfolio formation, but similar returns 
in the 23 previous months (–24 to –2). Wealth-weighted institutional breadth changes in the 
formation month represent sharp reversals of the prior ownership trends. Stocks with low wealth-
weighted  institutional  breadth  change  in  month  t  were  experiencing  relatively  high  wealth-
weighted institutional breadth changes in the prior seven months (middle graph) and have a 
higher  institutional  ownership  during  the  entire  24  months  prior  to  portfolio  formation  than 
stocks with high wealth-weighted institutional breadth change in month t (bottom graph). 
  The  bottom  graph  also  reveals  that  stocks  in  the  10th  to  90th  percentiles  of  wealth-
weighted  institutional  breadth  change  have  a  substantially  lower  institutional  ownership 
percentage than stocks in the two extreme deciles. In other words, stocks that do not experience 




V. Are the breadth change effects just proxies for profitable institutional trades against 
individuals? 
  Our results thus far show that when more retail investors hold a stock, its future returns 
are low, whereas when more institutions hold it, its future returns are high. A natural question 
then arises: does breadth change capture anything more than the tendency of institutions to profit 
at the expense of retail investors? We explore this issue using Fama-MacBeth regressions, which 
allow us to control for more variables than the portfolio-sort approach we used in Section III. 
                                                 
20 Recall, however, that the sample of stocks used to construct the wealth-weighted institutional breadth change 





  Recall  that  breadth  changes  are  more  volatile  among  large  stocks  than  small  stocks. 
Therefore, simply pooling all observations in a single Fama-MacBeth regression would cause the 
breadth coefficients to be identified mostly by the largest stocks. In order to avoid this, we run all 
the  Fama-MacBeth  regressions  in  this  paper  in  the  following  manner.  In  each  month  t,  we 
estimate five separate cross-sectional regressions, one for each tradable market capitalization 
quintile. The equal-weighted average of that variable’s five month t coefficients is that variable’s 
month  t  coefficient  for  the  overall  stock  universe.  We  then  apply  the  usual  Fama-MacBeth 
methodology to the overall coefficient series: the time-series average is the final point estimate 
of  the  coefficient,  and  the  time-series  standard  deviation  divided  by  the  square  root  of  the 
number of months in the sample is the standard error of the coefficient. 
  The first column of Table  8 shows  that when institutions in aggregate increase their 
holdings  of  a  stock  (implying  that  retail  investors  have  decreased  their  holdings),  the  stock 
performs well in the subsequent month. The coefficients are from a Fama-MacBeth regression 
where next month’s return is predicted by this month’s change in the stock’s log of institutional 
ownership percentage, log total market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and prior-year return 
excluding the current month. A one standard deviation increase in the log institutional ownership 
percentage change of a stock predicts a strongly significant increase in its next month’s return of 
0.333  ×  0.806  =  0.27%,  or  3.2%  on  an  annualized  basis.  The  second  column  of  Table  8 
additionally controls for the current month’s stock return, the sum of turnover during the current 
month and prior two months, the Amivest liquidity ratio during the current month, and dummies 
for the most recent week of trading volume being in the top decile or bottom decile of the last ten 
weeks. The point estimate on log institutional ownership percentage change barely moves to 
0.329, and it remains highly significant. 
  The third column of Table 8 adds a control for equal-weighted retail breadth change. 
Equal-weighted  retail  breadth  change  is  a  strong  negative  predictor  of  future  returns,  but 
institutional ownership change is now significant at only the 10% level and has a point estimate 
of 0.179, which is 55% that in the second column. One interpretation of this attenuation is that 
trading against equal-weighted retail breadth changes accounts for 45% of the profitability of 
institutional trades against retail investors. 
  The fourth column of Table 8 adds as an explanatory variable a dummy for a stock being 




We use a dummy instead of a linear control because of the nonlinear effect found in Table 5 
(stocks  in  the  highest  10  percentiles  of  wealth-weighted  institutional  breadth  change  earned 
abnormal  returns,  whereas  those  in  the  lowest  10  percentiles  did  not).  Log  institutional 
ownership percentage change’s point estimate attenuates another 51% relative to its value in the 
third column and is not significant even at the 10% level, but being in the top 10 percentiles of 
wealth-weighted institutional breadth change is a significantly positive predictor of future returns, 
and equal-weighted retail breadth change continues to be a significantly negative predictor. 
Collectively,  these  results  indicate  that  changes  in  institutional  ownership  percentage 
predict  future  returns  only  to  the  extent  that  they  are  correlated  with  equal-weighted  retail 
breadth  changes  or  wealth-weighted  institutional  breadth  changes.  Put  another  way,  breadth 
changes  do  not  predict  returns  because  they  are  merely  proxies  for  institutional  ownership 
percentage changes. Rather, institutional ownership percentage changes predict returns because 
they are proxies for breadth changes. An institution buying shares from an individual positively 
predicts  future  returns  only  if  the  individual  is  completely  liquidating  his  position  (perhaps 
signaling something about the depth of the retail population’s pessimism) or the institution does 
not already have shares of this company (indicating that its information is no longer censored by 
the short-sales constraint). 
 
VI. Does retail breadth change predict returns only because it is correlated with informed 
trading? 
  It is possible that retail breadth changes predict future returns not because retail investors 
push prices away from fundamentals, but because small retail investors are disproportionately 
likely to be counterparties to informed traders. Abnormal returns could then occur when these 
informed traders’ private information becomes public after the portfolio formation month. In this 
section, we provide some evidence that this channel is unlikely to account for all the predictive 
power of retail breadth changes. 
  If abnormal returns of portfolios formed on retail breadth changes are solely the result of 
private  information  becoming  public  after  the  portfolio  formation  date,  then  a  retail  breadth 
change in a month where the firm has made an earnings announcement should be less predictive 
of the next month’s returns. This is because the earnings announcement made public much of the 




leaving less of this private information to be revealed in the following month.
21 We therefore test 
whether retail breadth changes are less predictive of returns that occur in the month after an 
earnings announcement. 
  From 1996 to 2001, Chinese companies released earnings twice a year. Starting in 2002, 
earnings were released quarterly. Six calendar months—February, March, April, July, August, 
and October—collectively contain 99.75% of the earnings announcements between 1996 and 
2007. Using equal-weighted retail breadth changes in these six months to construct portfolios, 
we find that the average four-factor alpha difference between the highest and lowest breadth 
change portfolios in the following month, when relatively less private information should be 
revealed, is –1.98% (s.e. = 0.29, t = 6.83). In the other six months, the average four-factor alpha 
spread  is  –1.72%  (s.e.  =  0.31,  t  =  5.55).  These  two  alpha  spreads  are  not  statistically 
distinguishable from each other, and the larger magnitude of the alpha spread point estimate in 
the months following an earnings release is the opposite of what the informed-trading-only story 
would predict. 
  Because not all firms announce earnings in the same month, we can also use within-
month variation to identify whether equal-weighted retail breadth changes are less predictive of 
returns when the breadth changes occur in an earnings announcement month. The fifth column of 
Table 8 shows coefficients from a Fama-MacBeth return prediction regression where we control 
for  all  the  variables  we  used  in  Section  V,  a  dummy  for  whether  the  company  announced 
earnings  in  that  month,  and  interactions  of  that  dummy  with  equal-weighted  retail  breadth 
change  and  a  dummy  for  wealth-weighted  institutional  breadth  change  being  in  the  top  10 
percentiles  within  the  stock’s  size  quintile.  In  order  to  avoid  identifying  these  additional 
coefficients from only a tiny number of announcing companies, we restrict the sample to months 
when at least 100 firms in the Fama-MacBeth sample announced earnings and some firms did 
not announce earnings, which reduces the number of months in the regression from 137 to 34. 
The interaction between equal-weighted retail breadth change and the earnings announcement 
dummy is not significant, and its point estimate is negative, indicating that if anything, equal-
weighted retail breadth change is more predictive of future negative returns when breadth change 
is measured in an earnings-announcement month. 
                                                 
21 See  Tetlock  (2010)  for  evidence  that  public  financial  announcements  reduce  the  amount  of  asymmetric 




  In sum, both across-month and within-month comparisons indicate that equal-weighted 
retail breadth change is not less predictive of returns that occur when relatively little private 
information  is  revealed.  If  anything,  the  relationship  is  the  opposite.  This  suggests  that  the 
abnormal returns of portfolios formed using retail breadth change are not entirely due to retail 
breadth changes being negatively correlated with the trading flow of informed investors whose 
private information is subsequently revealed. 
 
VII. Is breadth change’s predictive power due to investor recognition? 
  Merton (1987) hypothesizes that when a stock is not widely held because investors are 
unaware of it, the investors who do hold the stock demand a return premium because they are 
overweighting it in their portfolios, sacrificing diversification. This return premium is captured 
by  the  variable  λ,  the  shadow  cost  of  incomplete  information.  To  test  whether  the  Merton 
“investor recognition” mechanism is responsible for our breadth change results, we repeat our 
Fama-MacBeth analysis while directly controlling for λ as operationalized by Bodnaruk and 
Ostberg (2009) to predict returns in the Swedish stock market.
22 
The penultimate column of Table 8 shows coefficients from a Fama-MacBeth regression 
where the dependent variable is next month’s return and the explanatory variables are λ and the 
full set of other controls from Section V. The coefficient on λ is insignificant and does not have 
the  predicted  positive  sign,  whereas  the  coefficient  on  equal-weighted  retail  breadth  change 
remains negative and strongly significant. The coefficient on the dummy for being in the top 10 
percentiles  of  wealth-weighted  institutional  breadth  change  attenuates  and  is  no  longer 
significant, but its standard error is large and the point estimate is not significantly different from 
its value in the fourth column of Table 8, where we did not control for λ.
23 
We conclude that there is no evidence that λ predicts future returns or is responsible for 
the ability of equal-weighted retail breadth changes to predict future returns. Wealth-weighted 
institutional breadth changes are no longer significant once we control for λ, but the fact that λ 
itself does not predict returns makes this finding difficult to interpret. 
                                                 
22 Our tables show results where λ is formed using equal-weighted breadth levels. Using wealth-weighted breadth 
levels instead gives nearly identical results. 
23 Note, however, that in addition to the difference in explanatory variables, the sample in the fourth column of 
Table 8 is not the same as the sample in the penultimate column. In order to compute λ, we need a stock to have 





VIII. Ownership initiations versus discontinuations 
In  this  section,  we  explore  whether  ownership  initiations  have  different  information 
content than ownership discontinuations. Recall that by construction, breadth change equals IN 
(the fraction of investors who initiate ownership) minus OUT (the fraction of investors who 
discontinue ownership). 
The last column of Table 8 shows coefficients from a Fama-MacBeth regression where 
the dependent variable is next month’s return and the explanatory variables are equal-weighted 
retail  IN,  equal-weighted  retail  OUT,  wealth-weighted  institutional  IN,  wealth-weighted 
institutional  OUT,  and  the  full  set  of  non-breadth  control  variables  from  Section  V.  The 
estimates show that the coefficient magnitude on retail IN is more than twice the coefficient 
magnitude on retail OUT, but both components of retail breadth change significantly predict 
returns.  The  fact  that  retail  OUT  predicts  returns  is  additional  evidence  against  the  investor 
recognition hypothesis being responsible for the ability of retail ownership breadth to predict 
returns, since investors who have just liquidated their holdings of a stock are presumably aware 
of its existence. Neither institutional IN or OUT are significant return predictors, which may be 
unsurprising given the non-linearity of the institutional breadth change effect in Table 5. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
  We have tested the ability of ownership breadth changes to forecast the cross-section of 
stock returns. The prior theory on the relationship between breadth and future returns makes 
predictions  about  breadth  measured  over  a  very  specific  population:  all  investors  in  a  stock 
market who face short-sales constraints. Our key innovation relative to past empirical studies is 
that  we  are  able  to  measure  breadth  over  this  theoretically  relevant  population  by  using  a 
representative sample of all investors in the Shanghai Stock Exchange, where short-selling is 
prohibited. We find that the relationship between ownership breadth and future returns depends 
crucially on the sub-population over which ownership breadth is measured.  
Contrary to the Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) hypothesis that breadth changes measure 
how  much  bad  news  is  being  withheld  from  prices  due  to  short-sales  constraints,  when 
ownership breadth measured over all investors increases (suggesting a relaxation of short-sales 




decisions of small retail investors. The negative relationship between total ownership breadth 
changes and future returns is consistent with contrarian retail trades inhibiting immediate full 
price  adjustment  to  fundamental  news.  Breadth  behaves  more  in  accordance  with  the  Chen, 
Hong, and Stein (2001) theory if it is measured only over a population of sophisticated investors. 
We find that a large increase in the wealth-weighted number of institutions that hold a stock in a 
given  month  predicts  a  high  stock  return  the  following  month.  However,  we  do  not  see 
corresponding underperformance following a large wealth-weighted decrease in the number of 
institutional owners.  
  Institutional trades against individuals are on average profitable before transactions costs. 
However, this profitability is almost entirely explained by these trades’ correlation with equal-
weighted retail breadth changes and wealth-weighted institutional breadth changes. This result 
indicates that how many shares in aggregate change hands between institutions and individuals 
does not matter as much as how many of each investor type start and end with holdings of the 
stock, thus demonstrating the value of disaggregated investor-level data for forecasting future 
returns. 
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 Table 1. Portfolio and position summary statistics 
This table reports (in RMB), separately for retail and institutional investors at the beginning of each year in our sample, the mean and 
median of investors’ individual stock position values and the mean and median of investors’ total stock portfolio value. 
 
  Retail investors  Institutional investors 
  Individual position value  Total portfolio value  Individual position value  Total portfolio value 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
1996  8,069  3,900 22,179 8,680  738,976  54,375  3,572,650  198,102 
1997  11,091 5,680 28,735  12,375  802,767  47,880  2,921,252  119,175 
1998  11,241  5,696  30,802  13,313 1,090,328 42,205 3,788,510 86,440 
1999  12,536  6,100  33,955  14,177 2,400,134 40,358 8,294,886  102,264 
2000  16,879  7,920  43,468  17,908 3,114,389 36,960 9,977,062  118,080 
2001  17,528  8,477  46,671  19,895 2,389,368 34,700 8,211,759  133,313 
2002  15,047  7,220  40,557  17,159 2,026,537 45,570 8,309,475  184,118 
2003  13,768  6,349  37,537  15,025 2,320,780 37,400 9,515,146  216,850 
2004  14,040 6,040 38,423  14,360  3,242,438  55,680  13,177,925  286,178 
2005  11,261 4,308 30,463  10,390  4,107,368  54,810  16,793,688  203,138 
2006  17,915 5,627 46,182  13,172  7,195,547  134,456  26,866,712  288,191 
2007  21,992 6,670 54,759  13,620  8,153,493  185,187  32,808,349  330,908 
 
  
Table 2. Summary statistics of variables used in cross-sectional analysis 
The cross-sectional means and standard deviations are calculated separately within each month. 
The table reports the time-series average of these means and standard deviations. Equal-weighted 
total breadth change is the change between month-ends t – 1 and t in the number of investors 
holding stock i divided by the total number of investors. Wealth-weighted total breadth change is 
like equal-weighted total breadth change, but weights investors by the value of their SSE stock 
portfolio at the open of month t. Institutional and retail breadth changes are defined analogously 
on the retail or institutional subsample. Equal-weighted retail IN is the percent of retail investors 
who held no position in the stock at t – 1 but held a positive position in it at t. Equal-weighted 
retail OUT is the percent of retail investors who held a positive position in the stock at t – 1 but 
held no position in it at t. Wealth-weighted institutional IN and OUT are defined analogously 
over institutions, weighting them by their SSE stock portfolio value at the open of month t. 
Breadth changes, IN, and OUT are expressed as percentages, so that a 1 percent value is coded as 
1, rather than 0.01. The variable λi,t is the Merton shadow cost of incomplete information defined 
in equation (2), and ∆log(Institutional ownershipi,t) is the change between month-ends t – 1 and t 
in the log of the fraction of the stock’s tradable A shares held by institutions. Returni,t –11→t – 1 is 
the stock’s cumulative return from month t – 11 to t – 1. Liquidity ratio is the sum of the stock’s 
yuan trading volume divided by the sum of the stock’s absolute daily returns during month t. 
High relative volume and low relative volume are dummies for whether the stock’s share trading 
volume during the prior week was in the top tenth or bottom tenth of the ten most recent weeks, 
respectively. The sample is stock-months where there are a positive number of individual 
investors and a positive number of institutional investors at both t and t – 1. 
 
  Mean Standard deviation
Returni, t+1  1.944 9.422 
ΔEqual-weighted total breadthi,t  -0.002 0.051 
ΔEqual-weighted retail breadthi,t  -0.002 0.051 
   Equal-weighted retail INi,t  0.067 0.074 
   Equal-weighted retail OUTi,t  0.069 0.075 
ΔEqual-weighted institutional breadthi,t -0.009 0.194 
ΔWealth-weighted total breadthi,t  -0.031 0.265 
ΔWealth-weighted retail breadthi,t  -0.025 0.115 
ΔWealth-weighted institutional breadthi,t -0.114 2.123 
   Wealth-weighted institutional INi,t 0.542 1.558 
   Wealth-weighted institutional OUTi,t 0.656 1.684 
λi,t  0.011 0.039 
∆log(Institutional ownershipi,t)  0.009 0.806 
log(Total market capi,t)  14.562 0.786 
Book-to-marketi,t  0.409 0.193 
Returni,t –11→t – 1  17.413 37.316 
Prior quarter turnoveri,t  1.105 0.603 
Liquidity ratioi,t  0.936 1.387 
High relative volumei,t  0.124 0.275 
Low relative volumei,t  0.145 0.271 Table 3. Mean and standard deviation of breadth change in each year 
This table shows the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation (in parentheses below 
the mean) of the six kinds of breadth change within each year. The means and standard 
deviations are calculated separately within each month, and we report the time-series 
average of these means and standard deviations within each year. 
 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Total  Retail  Inst.  Total  Retail  Inst. 
1996  -0.009 -0.009 -0.069 -0.126 -0.111 -0.446 
  (0.177) (0.177) (0.486) (0.455) (0.461) (2.505) 
1997  0.014  0.014 -0.020 -0.034 -0.033 -0.005 
  (0.113) (0.113) (0.296) (0.221) (0.224) (1.508) 
1998  0.000  0.000 -0.016 -0.027 -0.025 -0.147 
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.200) (0.198) (0.133) (4.509) 
1999  -0.002 -0.002 -0.013 -0.033 -0.025 -0.167 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.159) (0.295) (0.097) (5.160) 
2000  0.001  0.001 -0.015 -0.035 -0.023 -0.175 
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.188) (0.295) (0.106) (3.884) 
2001  0.002  0.002 -0.012 -0.024 -0.010 -0.211 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.130) (0.168) (0.044) (2.503) 
2002  -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.026 -0.008 -0.158 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.129) (0.214) (0.035) (2.536) 
2003  -0.001 -0.001 -0.013 -0.070 -0.010 -0.525 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.207) (0.286) (0.061) (2.246) 
2004  0.000  0.000 -0.005 -0.020 -0.009 -0.067 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.222) (0.286) (0.051) (1.607) 
2005  -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 0.009 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.192) (0.329) (0.054) (1.291) 
2006  -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.220) (0.450) (0.104) (1.452) 
2007 0.004  0.004  0.003  -0.017  -0.024  0.000 
 (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.148)  (0.569) (0.112) (1.474) Table 4. Correlation of breadth change measures with each other 
Each month, we calculate the cross-sectional correlation of each breadth measure with 
the other breadth measures. The table reports the time-series mean of these correlations, 
with the standard error (computed as the time-series standard deviation of the correlation 
divided by the square root of the number of months) in parentheses below. 
 
   Equal-weighted breadth change Wealth-weighted breadth change
   Total  Retail Inst. Total Retail  Inst.
Equal-  Total  1.000** 1.000** 0.058** 0.128** 0.643** -0.117** 
weighted   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
breadth  Retail   1.000**  0.054** 0.127**  0.643**  -0.117** 
change     (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
  Inst.     1.000** 0.294**  0.141**  0.305** 
       (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.013) 
Wealth-  Total      1.000**  0.347**  0.811** 
weighted       (0.000)  (0.032)  (0.026) 
breadth  Retail       1.000**  -0.030* 
change        (0.000)  (0.012) 
  Inst.        1.000** 
             (0.000) 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. Table 5. Monthly returns on breadth change portfolios 
This table shows the raw return in excess of the riskfree rate and one, three, and four-factor alphas from portfolios that are formed 
based on the prior month’s equal- or wealth-weighted breadth change among the total, retail, or institutional investor sample. At the 
end of each month t, we first sort stocks into tradable market capitalization quintiles, and then calculate month t breadth change 
breakpoints within each size quintile. We value-weight stocks within each market cap × breadth change sub-portfolio. For the total 
and retail investor samples, to form the “Quintile n” portfolio, we equally weight across the market cap quintiles the five nth quintile 
breadth change sub-portfolios, and hold the stocks for one month before re-forming the portfolios. The “5 – 1” return is the difference 
between the Quintile 5 and Quintile 1 portfolio returns. For institutions, to form the “< 10th percentile” portfolio, we equally weight 
across the size quintiles the five sub-portfolios whose breadth change is less than the 10th percentile and hold the stocks for one month 
before re-forming the portfolio. The other portfolios are formed in an analogous fashion. The “≥ 90th – < 10th” return is the difference 
between the “≥ 90th percentile” return and the “< 10th percentile” return. Returns are expressed in percentages, so that a 1 percent 
return is coded as 1, rather than 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Total breadth change portfolios 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Raw return  CAPM alpha 3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha Raw return CAPM alpha 3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha
Quintile  1  2.87** 1.01** 1.10** 1.12** 2.18** 0.37  0.49*  0.52** 
(lowest breadth change)   (0.77) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) (0.74) (0.25) (0.20) (0.19) 
Quintile  2  2.41** 0.49  0.54** 0.58** 2.16** 0.28  0.32  0.35* 
  (0.79) (0.27) (0.19) (0.17) (0.77) (0.27) (0.19) (0.17) 
Quintile  3  1.93*  0.13 0.26 0.28 1.91*  0.03 0.11 0.15 
  (0.74) (0.26) (0.18) (0.18) (0.79) (0.31) (0.21) (0.19) 
Quintile  4  1.80*  -0.09 0.00 0.04 1.70*  -0.15  -0.06  -0.03 
  (0.78) (0.27) (0.21) (0.19) (0.77) (0.28) (0.20) (0.19) 
Quintile  5  0.84  -1.01** -0.87** -0.83**  1.82*  -0.08  0.08  0.10 
(highest breadth change)  (0.76) (0.28) (0.22) (0.20) (0.77) (0.23) (0.18) (0.17) 
5  –  1  -2.04** -2.02** -1.97** -1.94** -0.36*  -0.45*  -0.41*  -0.42* 
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
  Panel B: Retail breadth change portfolios 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Raw return  CAPM alpha 3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha Raw return CAPM alpha 3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha
Quintile  1  2.88** 1.02** 1.11** 1.13** 2.59** 0.73** 0.86** 0.88** 
(lowest breadth change)   (0.77) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) (0.76) (0.26) (0.21) (0.20) 
Quintile  2  2.46** 0.52  0.57** 0.61** 2.18** 0.31  0.36  0.40* 
  (0.79) (0.27) (0.19) (0.17) (0.77) (0.28) (0.19) (0.17) 
Quintile  3  1.91*  0.13 0.25 0.27 1.93*  0.11 0.20 0.23 
  (0.74) (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.75) (0.28) (0.19) (0.18) 
Quintile  4  1.79*  -0.08  -0.00 0.04 1.86*  -0.03 0.06 0.09 
  (0.77) (0.27) (0.21) (0.19) (0.78) (0.27) (0.19) (0.18) 
Quintile  5  0.86  -1.00** -0.85** -0.81**  1.19  -0.70** -0.57** -0.53** 
(highest breadth change)  (0.77) (0.27) (0.22) (0.19) (0.77) (0.25) (0.19) (0.17) 
5  –  1  -2.03** -2.02** -1.96** -1.93** -1.39** -1.43** -1.43** -1.42** 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Panel C: Institutional breadth change portfolios 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Raw return  CAPM alpha 3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha Raw return CAPM alpha 3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha
<  10th  2.35**  0.56  0.63* 0.67* 1.92* 0.06  0.12  0.15 
percentile  (0.76) (0.32) (0.29) (0.28) (0.75) (0.22) (0.18) (0.17) 
10th  to  90th  1.92*  0.04 0.13 0.17 1.87*  0.00 0.09 0.13 
percentiles (0.77)  (0.26) (0.18) (0.16) (0.77) (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) 
≥  90th  1.92*  0.04 0.18 0.19 2.51**  0.66*  0.83**  0.81** 
percentile  (0.77) (0.25) (0.20) (0.20) (0.76) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) 
≥ 90th – < 10th  -0.44  -0.52  -0.45  -0.48  0.58*  0.60*  0.71*  0.67** 
  (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. Table 6. Persistence of long-short breadth change portfolio alphas 
This table shows the one, three, and four-factor alphas from zero-investment portfolios 
that are formed based on breadth change that is either equal- or wealth-weighted among 
all, retail, or institutional investors. To form the “Month t + k” portfolio, we sort stocks 
into quintiles based on their month t tradable market capitalization. Then within each size 
quintile, we calculate month t breadth change quintile breakpoints (for total and retail 
breadth change) or 10th and 90th percentile month t breadth change breakpoints (for 
institutional breadth change). We weight stocks by t + k – 1 tradable market capitalization 
within each size × breadth change sub-portfolio. We then hold long an equal-weighted 
portfolio of all the highest breadth change sub-portfolios across the size quintiles and 
short an equal-weighted portfolio of all the lowest breadth change sub-portfolios across 
size quintiles during month t + k before stocks are re-sorted into (possibly) new 
portfolios. The number of months used to construct the estimates decreases as k increases 
due to the boundaries of our sample period. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: One-factor alphas 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Total  Retail  Inst.  Total  Retail  Inst. 
Month t + 2  -0.95**  -0.93**  0.13  -0.12  -0.58**  0.20 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.18) (0.17) (0.25) 
Month t + 3  -0.93**  -0.94**  0.02  -0.21  -0.61**  0.15 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.16) (0.19) (0.26) 
Month t + 4  -0.63**  -0.63**  -0.45  -0.02  -0.35  0.14 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.31) (0.19) (0.18) (0.22) 
Month t +  5  -0.42* -0.41*  0.14  -0.33* -0.38* -0.11 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.27) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) 
Month t +  6  -0.27  -0.26 0.25 0.09  -0.13 0.22 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) 
Month t +  7  -0.19 -0.19 -0.35  0.12 -0.13  0.09 
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.27) (0.16) (0.20) (0.23) 
Month t +  8  -0.21 -0.20  0.25 -0.06 -0.13  0.43 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.16) (0.13) (0.24) 
Month t +  9  -0.01 -0.05 -0.00 -0.18 -0.25  0.04 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) 
Month t +  10  -0.19 -0.18 -0.39 -0.16 -0.29*  -0.20 
  (0.19) (0.18) (0.26) (0.16) (0.14) (0.22) 
Month t +  11  -0.09 -0.11 -0.10  0.18 -0.01  0.17 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.17) (0.15) (0.20) 
Month t + 12  -0.33*  -0.35*  -0.15  0.03  0.03  0.17 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.14) (0.17) (0.23) Panel B: Three-factor alphas 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Total  Retail  Inst.  Total  Retail  Inst. 
Month t + 2  -1.03**  -1.01**  0.09  -0.20  -0.65**  0.22 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.18) (0.17) (0.25) 
Month t + 3  -0.93**  -0.94**  -0.04  -0.17  -0.63**  0.30 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.16) (0.19) (0.25) 
Month t + 4  -0.69**  -0.70**  -0.33  -0.12  -0.40*  0.13 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.31) (0.19) (0.17) (0.23) 
Month t + 5  -0.47*  -0.46*  0.25  -0.31  -0.38*  -0.08 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.26) (0.17) (0.17) (0.23) 
Month t +  6  -0.26  -0.24 0.23 0.11  -0.14 0.26 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) 
Month t +  7  -0.20 -0.18 -0.25  0.20 -0.06  0.21 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.27) (0.16) (0.20) (0.22) 
Month t +  8  -0.18 -0.15  0.19 -0.08 -0.14  0.35 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.16) (0.13) (0.24) 
Month t + 9  0.06 0.01 0.11  -0.10  -0.24 0.11 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) 
Month t +  10  -0.20 -0.17 -0.34 -0.12 -0.28*  -0.15 
  (0.19) (0.18) (0.26) (0.16) (0.14) (0.22) 
Month t +  11  -0.11 -0.14 -0.06  0.22 -0.00  0.26 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) 
Month t + 12  -0.30  -0.32*  -0.15  0.07  0.02  0.17 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) (0.14) (0.17) (0.23) 
 
   
Panel C: Four-factor alphas 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Total  Retail  Inst.  Total  Retail  Inst. 
Month t + 2  -1.02**  -1.00**  0.07  -0.20  -0.65**  0.22 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.18) (0.17) (0.25) 
Month t + 3  -0.90**  -0.92**  -0.03  -0.17  -0.64**  0.31 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.16) (0.19) (0.25) 
Month t + 4  -0.70**  -0.71**  -0.32  -0.14  -0.40*  0.11 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.31) (0.18) (0.17) (0.23) 
Month t + 5  -0.43*  -0.42*  0.25  -0.30  -0.34*  -0.08 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.17) (0.16) (0.23) 
Month t +  6  -0.22  -0.21 0.22 0.08  -0.12 0.22 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.16) (0.15) (0.23) 
Month t +  7  -0.14 -0.11 -0.22  0.20 -0.01  0.20 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.16) (0.19) (0.22) 
Month t + 8  -0.15 -0.12  0.15 -0.10 -0.15  0.31 
  (0.17) (0.18) (0.24) (0.16) (0.13) (0.23) 
Month t +  9  0.09 0.05 0.13  -0.07  -0.21 0.13 
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) 
Month t +  10  -0.21 -0.18 -0.34 -0.15 -0.30*  -0.19 
  (0.19) (0.18) (0.27) (0.15) (0.14) (0.22) 
Month t +  11  -0.08  -0.10  -0.01 0.22 0.01 0.26 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.23) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20) 
Month t + 12  -0.28  -0.30  -0.20  0.11  0.05  0.20 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) (0.15) (0.17) (0.24) 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
 Table 7. Long-short breadth change portfolio alphas among subsamples 
This table shows the one, three, and four-factor alphas from zero-investment portfolios 
that are formed based on breadth change within subsets of our sample: between 1996 and 
2001; between 2002 and 2007; within only the smallest tradable market capitalization 
quintile; within only the largest tradable market capitalization quintile; or excluding 
stocks for which less than one year has elapsed since a share issuance or repurchase 
event. Breadth change is either equal- or wealth-weighted among all, retail, or 
institutional investors. We sort stocks into size quintiles based on their month t tradable 
market capitalization, and calculate month t breadth change quintile breakpoints (for all 
and retail investors) or 10th and 90th percentile month t breadth change breakpoints (for 
institutional investors) within each size quintile. We weight stocks within each size × 
breadth change sub-portfolio by tradable market capitalization. With the exception of the 
analyses that include only the smallest or largest size quintile, the portfolios whose alphas 
we report are long an equal-weighted portfolio of all the highest breadth change sub-
portfolios across size quintiles and short an equal-weighted portfolio of all the lowest 
breadth change sub-portfolios across size quintiles. Stocks are held for one month during 
t + 1 before they are re-sorted into (possibly) new sub-portfolios. Because of months 
where some size × breadth change subportfolios are empty, the smallest size quintile 
equal-weighted institutional breadth change returns are calculated using only 133 months, 
and the largest size quintile equal-weighted institutional breadth change returns are 
calculated using only 136 months. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: One-factor alphas 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Total  Retail  Inst.  Total  Retail  Inst. 
1996-2001  -2.44** -2.46** -1.29*  -1.24** -1.95**  0.09 
  (0.30) (0.30) (0.57) (0.27) (0.25) (0.47) 
2002-2007  -1.58**  -1.55** 0.30  0.39* -0.88** 1.13** 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.21) (0.17) (0.19) (0.25) 
Smallest size quintile  -1.73**  -1.75**  0.09  -0.60  -0.99**  0.31 
  (0.32) (0.33) (0.51) (0.34) (0.32) (0.41) 
Largest  size  quintile  -2.21** -2.20** -0.11  0.22  -1.42**  1.51* 
  (0.44) (0.44) (0.55) (0.39) (0.35) (0.62) 
No issuances or  -1.95**  -1.93**  -0.35  -0.44*  -1.27**  0.69* 
repurchases in last year  (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (0.20) (0.20) (0.31) 
  Panel B: Three-factor alphas 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Total  Retail  Inst.  Total  Retail  Inst. 
1996-2001  -2.26** -2.28** -1.18*  -1.20** -1.97**  0.29 
  (0.30) (0.31) (0.59) (0.28) (0.27) (0.48) 
2002-2007  -1.57**  -1.54** 0.31  0.38* -0.81** 1.07** 
  (0.30) (0.30) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (0.26) 
Smallest size quintile  -1.66**  -1.69**  0.31  -0.44  -0.81*  0.33 
  (0.33) (0.34) (0.51) (0.33) (0.31) (0.41) 
Largest  size  quintile  -2.07** -2.06** -0.20  0.28  -1.43**  1.68** 
  (0.44) (0.44) (0.56) (0.40) (0.35) (0.60) 
No issuances or  -1.88**  -1.91**  -0.40  -0.43*  -1.27**  0.77* 
repurchases in last year  (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (0.21) (0.20) (0.31) 
Panel C: Four-factor alphas 
  Equal-weighted breadth change  Wealth-weighted breadth change 
  Total  Retail  Inst.  Total  Retail  Inst. 
1996-2001  -2.34** -2.37** -1.08  -1.17** -2.02**  0.45 
  (0.28) (0.29) (0.58) (0.28) (0.26) (0.43) 
2002-2007  -1.54**  -1.52** 0.31  0.38* -0.80** 1.06** 
  (0.30) (0.30) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (0.26) 
Smallest size quintile  -1.66**  -1.68**  0.32  -0.41  -0.78*  0.33 
  (0.33) (0.34) (0.51) (0.33) (0.31) (0.42) 
Largest  size  quintile  -2.04** -2.03** -0.26  0.22  -1.45**  1.61** 
  (0.44) (0.43) (0.54) (0.38) (0.35) (0.58) 
No issuances or  -1.86**  -1.89**  -0.45  -0.44*  -1.26**  0.71* 
repurchases in last year  (0.24) (0.24) (0.29) (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. Table 8. Future returns: Fama-MacBeth regressions 
This table shows coefficients from monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions where the dependent variable is the stock’s month t + 1 return. 
Each month, we run cross-sectional regressions separately within each tradable market capitalization quintile and average the 
coefficients from these five regressions. The coefficients reported in the table are time-series averages of these averaged coefficients, 
and the standard errors in parentheses are based on the time-series standard deviations of these averaged coefficients. Most of the 
explanatory variables are as defined in Table 2. “Top 10% of Δwealth-weighted inst. breadth” is a dummy variable for a stock being in 
the top ten percentiles of month t’s wealth-weighted institutional breadth change distribution within its tradable market capitalization 
quintile. “Earnings announced” is a dummy variable for the company announcing earnings in month t. Average R
2 is the average of 
the cross-sectional regressions’ R
2 values. Stock-months are excluded from the sample if there are not a positive number of retail 
investors and a positive number of institutional investors in the stock at both t and t – 1. 
 
∆log(Institutional    0.333**  0.329**  0.179 0.087 0.202  0.238  0.095 
 ownershipi,t)  (0.088) (0.098) (0.096)  (0.092) (0.141)  (0.263)  (0.115) 
ΔEqual-weighted retail       -39.540** -37.554** -28.319*  -35.886**   
 breadthi,t     (4.539)  (4.685)  (12.866)  (5.962)   
Top 10% of Δwealth-       0.606*  -0.362  0.003   
 weighted inst. breadthi,t      (0.267)  (0.989)  (0.434)   
log(Total market capi,t) -0.396  -0.266  -0.283 -0.300  0.349  -0.348 -0.350 
 (0.203)  (0.210)  (0.208)  (0.205) (0.423)  (0.257)  (0.209) 
Book-to-marketi,t  1.343*  1.566**  1.319* 1.382* 2.189  -0.508  1.756** 
 (0.575)  (0.555)  (0.548)  (0.548) (1.122)  (0.999)  (0.536) 
Returni,t –11→t – 1 ÷ 100  0.763  1.051*  1.291*  1.267*  1.642  2.680*  1.021* 
 (0.523)  (0.529)  (0.523)  (0.523) (0.918)  (1.064)  (0.491) 
Returni,t ÷ 100    -1.731  -5.855** -6.158** 0.901  -4.849*  -5.694** 
    (1.530)  (1.570) (1.581) (2.850)  (2.169)  (1.582) 
Prior quarter turnoveri,t    -0.622**  -0.560* -0.547* -0.718 -0.329  -0.294 
    (0.232)  (0.234) (0.239) (0.374)  (0.334)  (0.238) 
Liquidity ratioi,t   -1.934**  -1.898** -1.910** -3.317** -2.921  -1.510* 
    (0.635)  (0.631) (0.673) (1.015)  (1.701)  (0.748)  
High relative volumei,t   -0.643**  -0.529*  -0.518*  0.953  -0.131  -0.492* 
   (0.246)  (0.246)  (0.248)  (1.780) (0.305)  (0.240) 
Low relative volumei,t   0.231  0.178  0.189  -0.746  0.351  0.244 
   (0.227)  (0.229)  (0.233) (0.440)  (0.304)  (0.234) 
Earnings announcedi,t       -0.409     
       (0.408)    
Earnings announcedi,t ×       -3.644     
 ΔEW retail breadthi,t       (15.576)    
Earnings announcedi,t ×       0.913     
 Top 10% of ΔWW  
 inst. breadthi,t      
(0.971) 
  
λi,t        -14.384   
        (23.070)   
Equal-weighted            -52.075** 
 retail INi,t          (6.884) 
Equal-weighted            20.728** 
 retail OUTi,t          (6.265) 
Wealth-weighted           -0.456 
 inst. INi,t          (1.832) 
Wealth-weighted           0.426 
 inst. OUTi,t          (1.514) 
Constant  7.254* 6.911* 7.082* 7.271*  -1.435 8.635*  8.000* 
  (3.227) (3.262) (3.260) (3.218) (6.090)  (3.828)  (3.295) 
# months  137 137 137 137  34 137  137 
Average R
2  0.104 0.211 0.233 0.247 0.270  0.363  0.281 





Figure 1. Returns, equal-weighted retail breadth change, and institutional 
ownership in 48-month window around portfolio formation date. The series shown 
represent statistics on portfolios formed on equal-weighted retail breadth change, as 
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Figure 2. Returns, wealth-weighted institutional breadth change, and institutional 
ownership in 48-month window around portfolio formation date. The series shown 
represent portfolios formed on wealth-weighted institutional breadth change, as described 
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